Distributed interpolatory algorithms for set membership estimation

This work addresses the distributed estimation problem in a set membership framework. The agents of a network collect measurements which are affected by bounded errors, thus implying that the unknown parameters to be estimated belong to a suitable feasible set. Two distributed algorithms are considered, based on projections of the estimate of each agent onto its local feasible set. The main contribution of the paper is to show that such algorithms are asymptotic interpolatory estimators, i.e. they converge to an element of the global feasible set, under the assumption that the feasible set associated to each measurement is convex. The proposed techniques are demonstrated on a distributed linear regression estimation problem

Wage Inequality in Europe: the Role of Labour Market and Redistributive Institutions

This paper aims at a deeper understanding of the determinants of wage inequality, the most important component of income inequality, in the European countries. We investigate on how wage inequality is affected by government regulation in the labour market and by the redistribution operated by the social protection system, also controlling for the impact of the effect of skillpremium related to technical change. To explain the continuously rising wage inequality in Europe, two regression models of wage inequality are employed each one using a different databases. In the last period, the overall degree of governance of the labour markets does not substantially change, but a different balance between decreasing labour market regulation and increasing redistribution manifest across Europe. While job and wage protection has been eased, income redistribution was strengthened, though its size differs across four clusters of European countries, depending on the majority voting preference for “risk insurance”. Overall, institutional substitution between labour market regulation and income redistribution seems to back the upward trend in wage inequality

Alternative Approaches to Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Stances in Europe

From Maastricht on, how did fiscal authorities (FAs) deal with the two objectives of output stabilization and debt consolidation? To answer this question, we need a measure of the fiscal stance, in order to single out discretionary fiscal policy. Fiscal stance = variation of the primary budget (fiscal impulse), to accomplish the target for total budget

Direct torque control for dual three-phase induction motor drives

A direct torque control (DTC) strategy for dual three-phase induction motor drives is discussed in this paper. The induction machine has two sets of stator three-phase windings spatially shifted by 30 electrical degrees. The DTC strategy is based on a predictive algorithm and is implemented in a synchronous reference frame aligned with the machine stator flux vector. The advantages of the discussed control strategy are constant inverter switching frequency, good transient and steady-state performance, and low distortion of machine currents with respect to direct self-control (DSC) and other DTC schemes with variable switching frequency. Experimental results are presented for a 10-kW DTC dual three-phase induction motor drive prototype

Eliciting Motives for Trust and Reciprocity by Attitudinal and Behavioural Measures

Value Surveys may reveal well-behaved societies by the statistical treatment of the agents’ declarations of compliance with social values. Similarly, the results of experiments conducted on games with conflict of interest trace back to two important primitives of social capital – trust and reciprocity – which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash equilibrium and which lead to the optimal cooperative outcome. In this paper we attempt to elicit the true motive(s) underlying the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of surveys in this regard goes beyond the simple comparison of answers to a questionnaire with actual behaviour. Specifically the paper uses descriptive statistics and ordered probit models to analyse whether, and to what extent, answers to a questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects’ behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Game, disentangles the strategic and altruistic motivations. We find no simple or direct correlation between behavioural trust or trustworthiness and attitudinal trust or disposition to reciprocate. However, dividing subjects according to attitudinal trust and trustworthiness, we observe that the link between the questionnaire and experimental sessions is more subtle than the mere correlation between average attitudes and average behaviours. The information conveyed by a survey appears to be much more powerful ex post – once the two motivational components have been separated out.trust, reciprocity, experimental economics, ordered probit

A Distributed Asynchronous Method of Multipliers for Constrained Nonconvex Optimization

This paper presents a fully asynchronous and distributed approach for tackling optimization problems in which both the objective function and the constraints may be nonconvex. In the considered network setting each node is active upon triggering of a local timer and has access only to a portion of the objective function and to a subset of the constraints. In the proposed technique, based on the method of multipliers, each node performs, when it wakes up, either a descent step on a local augmented Lagrangian or an ascent step on the local multiplier vector. Nodes realize when to switch from the descent step to the ascent one through an asynchronous distributed logic-AND, which detects when all the nodes have reached a predefined tolerance in the minimization of the augmented Lagrangian. It is shown that the resulting distributed algorithm is equivalent to a block coordinate descent for the minimization of the global augmented Lagrangian. This allows one to extend the properties of the centralized method of multipliers to the considered distributed framework. Two application examples are presented to validate the proposed approach: a distributed source localization problem and the parameter estimation of a neural network.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1803.0648

Do Preferences in EU Member-States Support Fiscal Federalism?

The aim of this paper is to assess preferences with respect to fiscal federalism in EU member-states. In particular, we address the question of whether each EU country would - if the decision were taken by 'majority voting' - or should – if the decision were takenby a social planner – favour centralisation or decentralisation of mutual risk insurance. Our analysis implicitly assumes that each EU median voter or each EU social planner takes the composition of the fiscal federation as given, leaving aside the issue of how manyand which countries take part in the optimal EU fiscal federation. With majority voting, the median voter 'individual' and the median voter 'region' in each EU country are decisive. In this situation, the national (federal) government level for redistribution is preferredif the national ratio between median income and mean income is lower (higher) than the EU ratio. In contrast, were the decision taken by the social planner, the choice in favour of centralisation(decentralisation) would be derived from the maximisation of a social welfare function. In terms of European regions, the index of 'jurisdictional distance' indicates that social welfare ismaximised by (de)centralised redistribution whenever intra -national income dispersion is greater (smaller) than inter-national income dispersion. The results show that, for the large majority ofEU member-states, when one of the two decision-makers prefers centralisation (decentralisation), the other has the opposite preference; moreover, the chosen government level is in most cases thesame for interpersonal redistribution and inter-jurisdictional redistribution: what is good for the individual is also good for the nation.Income Distribution ; Public Choice ; Fiscal Federalism ; European Economics

Europe's Great Divide. A geo-economic-political map. LEQS Discussion Paper No. 101/2015 December 2015

It is now widely agreed that an important driver of the European economic crisis has been the faulty original design of the Monetary Union, and that substantial steps are urgently needed towards the creation of truly European fiscal institutions. The notorious stumbling block along this path is political will. By cross-referencing the results of the 2014 elections of the European Parliament with Eurobarometer opinion polls and an indicator of economic pain, we argue that Europe experiences an unresolved tension between "more Europe" and "less Europe" at the level of European peoples. Data analysis at the country level reveals a surge of what we call Europe's Great Divide, a geo-economic-political cleavage across the EU and across the EZ as well. This is more complex, and perhaps worse, than the simplistic divide between "North" and "South" or "Core" and "Periphery", and it seriously undermines support for ‘more Europe’ "from below"

Randomized Block Proximal Methods for Distributed Stochastic Big-Data Optimization

open2noThis work was supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under Grant 638992—OPT4SMARTIn this article, we introduce a class of novel distributed algorithms for solving stochastic big-data convex optimization problems over directed graphs. In the addressed set-up, the dimension of the decision variable can be extremely high and the objective function can be nonsmooth. The general algorithm consists of two main steps: a consensus step and an update on a single block of the optimization variable, which is then broadcast to neighbors. Three special instances of the proposed method, involving particular problem structures, are then presented. In the general case, the convergence of a dynamic consensus algorithm over random row stochastic matrices is shown. Then, the convergence of the proposed algorithm to the optimal cost is proven in expected value. Exact convergence is achieved when using diminishing (local) stepsizes, whereas approximate convergence is attained when constant stepsizes are employed. The convergence rate is shown to be sublinear and an explicit rate is provided in the case of constant stepsizes. Finally, the algorithm is tested on a distributed classification problem, first on synthetic data and, then, on a real, high-dimensional, text dataset.openFarina, Francesco; Notarstefano, GiuseppeFarina, Francesco; Notarstefano, Giusepp